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INDEMNIFICATION BEFORE PAYMENT -
A NEW REMEDY FOR THE SURETY?
By T A. SMEDLEY*
In order to protect himself against ultimate loss upon his
suretyship obligations, the surety may call upon a varied array
of legal remedies. As soon as he has paid the creditor, he may
sue the principal debtor at law to enforce his direct right of reim-
bursement or indemnity, or he may seek repayment by the de-
rivative route of subrogation to the rights of the creditor. Without
having first paid the debt, he may bring a suit in equity for
exoneration to force the principal debtor to pay the creditor;
and in some jurisdictions he may, by proper formal notice and
demand, require the creditor to attempt to collect from the prin-
cipal debtor before enforcing the suretyship liability. Through
the several centuries in which the suretyship transaction has been
sanctioned by law, the scope and limits of these rights have become
fairly well defined.'
Seeking further to minimize the risk of the undertaking, sure-
ties have occasionally tried to add another weapon to their arsenal
of remedies, in the form of a recovery of damages from the prin-
cipal debtor before any payment has been made on the debt. The
theory advanced is that the principal debtor is under obligation
to the surety to pay the creditor at the maturity of the debt, that
failure so to pay constitutes a breach of contract, and that the
surety's damages from such breach are to be measured in the
amount in which he remains liable to the creditor. The late
Dean Arant, who for many years was recognized as the foremost
authority on this branch of the law disposed of this device in
short order. By contrast with the surety s equitable remedy of
exoneration he asserts: "At law, however, it was well settled that
no action could be maintained by the surety against the principal
* A.B., Illinois College; J.D., Northwestern. Professor of Law, Washington
and Lee University; Faculty Editor, Waslungton and Lee Law Review.
For discussions of these recognized rights of sureties, see ARATTn, SutErvsm,
(1931) §§ 71, 72, 73, 79; AmwoLD Suium's AND GuAANTY (1927) c. 6, 7, 8;
SimpsoN, Sun~rysim, (1950) §§ 42, 46, 47, 48.
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until he had paid some, though not necessarily all, of the prin-
cipal's debt.' 2 Professor Simpson, Arant s successor and heir in
Suretyship authority appears to concur with that view in de-
claring that "the surety s right to repayment as a present cause of
action against his principal [on the reimbursement theory] does
not arise until after the surety has paid the creditor."' 3 However,
at another point in his text, this rule is announced: "Exoneration
is purely equitable, but where the principal debtor has expressly
promised the surety to pay the latter can sue at law for breach of
the promise, even though the surety himself has not paid.
' 4
Strangely enough, the case authority cited for this proposition
consists of one mortgage case 5 and three decisions establishing
the surety s right of exoneration, without in any way indicating
the availability of an action for recovery of damages at law 0 Also
given is a reference to Williston on Contracts, wherein it is stated
that "where a principal violates a promise to a surety to pay the
creditor, the surety may recover, without paying the debt, from the
principal the full amount of the debt as damages."" Of the long
list of cases cited for this proposition, only one involves a true
suretyship situation;8 the others arise from a variety of transactions
out of which a quasi-suretyship relation of the parties might have
ARANT, SURETYSHIP (1931) 319. In the footnote, following case authority
sustaining the proposition stated, the qualification is added that if the principal
debtor has expressly promised the surety that he will pay the creditor at the
maturity of the debt, the surety may, without himself paying, recover the amount
of the debt as damages for the principal's failure to pay. The validity of this
qualification as declared more broadly in other sources, is the main concern of this
article.
SImPsoN, SURETSHr (1950) 224.
SIiIPsoN, SURPETYSHm, (1950) 201.
'Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 20 Am. Rep. 341 (1876). The plaintiff,
conveying his land to defendant subject to a mortgage debt which defendant as-
sumed, may be said to have taken on the status of surety to the defendant as
principal debtor. See note 38, infra. However, the Massachusetts court makes no
mention of suretyship considerations in its opinion.
Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 F 2d 976 (C.C.A.
8th, 1937) (The court specifically states that " As a complaint in an action at law,
such a petition would be premature; the plaintiff having paid nothing, may not
yet call for indemnity. "" 90 F 2d 976, 977); Admiral Oriental Line v.
United States, 86 F 2d 201 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) (The court took note of the
fact that the plaintiff could not sue at law, even though the creditor was suing
him for the dfebt on which he was suretv for the defendant-principal debtor.);
Carpenter v. Park, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 567, 66 P 2d 224 (1939).
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937 § 1408)
'Loosemore v. Radford, 9 M.&W 657, 152 Eng. Rep. 277 (1842).
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been found,9 though in few of the opinions is there any mention
of that aspect of the case.10
Thus, it appears that, contrary to earlier general assumption
and in violation of sound legal principle (or so it will be argued
here), the view has somehow developed that a surety may recover
from his principal debtor money in the amount of the liability of
the surety to the creditor, even though no such payment has
in tact been made.
The origin of this idea seems to lie in an accepted but unex
plained irrationality in the law of indemnity contracts. Though
the very word "indemnity" implies compensation for an actual
loss suffered,i a type of indemnity contract has become recognized
under which the indemnitee may have a cause of action before
being damnified. If the contract is to indemnify against loss or "to
save harmless" from damage, the covenantee has no right of action
until he incurs a loss of the kind indemnified against, and the
measure of his recovery is the amount of that loss. But if the con-
tract is to indemnify the promisee against a liability or to dis-
charge him from a debt, then the cause of action occurs at the
time the promisor fails to satisfy the debt when it matures or
otherwise fails to protect the promisee against being put under
liability to pay.12
In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "Any ap-
parent want of harmony in the decisions as to the right of a party
indemnified to recover without proof of loss by payment of the
debt or otherwise disappears when the nature of the undertaking
is considered and the distinction between an obligation to do a
" For example: Alexander v. MePeck, 189 Mass. 34, 75 N.E. 88 (1905), in
which plaintiff, a retiring member of a partnershio, received a promise from the
defendant, a new partner being added to the firm,-to release and discharge plain-
tiff from all existing partnership debts. Banfield v. Marks, 56 Cal. 185 (1880), in
which the grantee of land covenanted with his grantor to protect him against
liability for the debt to a third party secured by a mortgage on the land. Port v.
Jackson, 17 J6hns. 29 (1819), n which a lessee assgned is interest i the lease-
hold, the asIgnee covenanting to perform all the obligations of the lease, including
payment of rent to the lessor.
' I n n v. Stilwell, 9 Ohio St. 467 at 470 (1859) (partnership case) and
Sparkman v. Cove. 44 N.J.L. 252 at 254 (1882) (mortgage case), the courts,
while holding that the pronisee could collect damages 1n the amount of the
assumed debt without himself paying it, specifically took notice that a common
surety would not have such a right.
"Bouvier s Law Dictionary (Baldwin, 1934) 535.
2 SEDG)1vIcK, DA.NLrAcns (9th ed. 1912) §§ 786, 787" 5 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTs (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1409. See Stemert v. Galasso, 363 Pa. 393 69 A. 2d
841, 842 (1949).
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specified thing and one of indemnity against loss resulting from
nonperformance is observed. Where the indemnity is against lia-
bility, there~is a right of recovery as soon as a liability is incurred.
Where it is against loss by reason of a liability, there is no right of
recovery until a loss occurs."'13
This explanation leaves two problems unsolved: First, when
is the agreement to be regarded as an indemnification against loss
and when against liability - since the parties very often do not
make their intentions clear if, indeed, they had any specific in-
tentions in the matter; Second, if the contract is determined to be
for indemnity against liability, and it is breached by the indem-
nitor, what damages can the indemnitee show until he has actually
paid something under the liability?
The first problem would seem to call merely for an applica-
tion of the normal rules of construction for determining the
meaning of the terms of any ambiguous agreement. Unfortu-
nately the decisions furnish little instruction as to how the in-
terpretive process operates. The courts are prone to stress the
importance of drawing the distinction between indemnity against
loss and indemnity against liability rather than to expain the basis
for their conclusions in individual cases. 14 Perhaps, where the
parties have chosen to state-the obligation in the simple language
of indemnity the court should incline toward the interpretation
that the promisee was to be protected only against actual loss,
unless he can affirmatively show that the promisor s liability was
intended to go further. Actually the tendency seems to run in the
opposite direction, so much so in some instances that a court has
declared: "When the instrument deviates the least from a simple
contract to indemnify against damage, even where the indemnity
is the sole object of the contract, and where, in consequence of the
" Faulkner v. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298, 83 AUt. 827, 828 (1912) (italics sup-
plied). Quoted with approval in Morgan v. Loch, 95 Kan. 716, 149 Pac. 481, 432
(1915). "It is the distinction between an affirmative covenant for a specific thing,
and one of indemnity against damage by reason of the non-performance of the
thing specified." Gilbert v. Wiman, 1. N.Y. 550, 562, 49 Am. Dec. 359, 361
(1848).
"In Faulkner v. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298, 83 At. 827, 828 (1912) for example,
the court went to considerable lengths to explin the distinction and point out
that it is the essential point on which the decision must turn. Then in two of
the closing sentences of the opimon it announces suddenly that the promise in
question is one of "indemnity for the protection of the [promisee]" (which is
completely indecisive in itself), and that the plaintiff could not recover without
proof of loss. No indication is given as to why the covenant was so interpreted.
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primary liability of other persons, actual loss may be sustained, the
decisions of our courts, although by no means uniform, have grad-
ually inclined toward fixing the rule to be one of actual compensa-
tion for probable loss."' 5
However this may be, there is nearly unanimous agreement
that if the contract of indemnity includes not only the usual
promises to save harmless and protect from loss, but also contains
an express covenant to pay the promisee's debt to a third party,
the agreement is thereby constituted one to protect against the
liability itself and not merely against the actual loss from that
liability.1 Once again, this conclusion is regularly stated without
benefit of supporting logic. Indefinite references to the promisor s
having made a "positive covenant,"' 7 an "absolute agreement"'18
or an "unconditional contract"'19 to pay the debt appear prom-
inently in the opinions, but it is not clear why the "positive,"
"absolute" or "unconditional" obligation could not be to reim-
burse for loss instead of to prevent the incurring of liability The
Massachusetts court viewed the direct promise to pay as amounting
to "an agreement by the [promisor] that he will assume the debt
as his own, and that the [promisee] shall not be called upon to
pay it, or be put to any molestation or inconvenience by reason
thereof. '120 The rule finds its most frequent application in cases
of a promise by a grantee of land to his grantor to assume and
pay the debt which is secured by a mortgage on the land,21 and of
a promise by a new or a continumg partner to a retiring partner
to discharge the existing debts against the partnership.2 2 It has
" Devol v. McIntosh, 23 Ind. 529, 530 (1864).
"See Stemert v. Galasso, 363 Pa. 393, 69 A. 2d 481, 482 (1949); 2 SEDc-
WIcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) §§ 786, 789; Note (1925) 38 HAnv. L. REv. 502,
504; and cases cited, notes 17-23, infra.
" Loosenmore v. Radford, 9 M.&,V 657, 152 Eng. Rep. 277, 278 (1842).
' Helms v. Appleton, 43 Ind. App. 482, 85 N.E. 733, 735 (1908); Peterson
v. Henngton, 169 Minn. 65, 210 N.W 617, 618 (1926).
Fairfield v. Day, 71 N.H. 63, 51 Adt. 263 (1901).
Locke v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 107, 41 Am. Rep. 199, 212 (1881).
For example: White v. Schader, 185 Cal. 606, 198 Pac. 19 (1921); Morlan
v. Loch, 95 Kan. 716, 149 Pac. 431 (1915); Nutter v. Mroczka, 303 Mass. 343,
21 N.E. 2d 979 (1939); Gustafson v. Koehler, 177 Minn. 115, 224 N.W 699
(1929); Ruzyg v. Brown, 327 Pa. 61, 192 Ad. 876 (1937); Jefferson Cooperage
Co. v. Getz~ndanner, 116 VVa. 489, 182 S.E. 90 (1935). Contra: Thomsen v.
Kopp, 204 Iowa 1176, 216 N.W 725 (1927); John Deere Plow Co. v. Tumstra,
47 S.D. 555, 200 N.W 61 (1924).
= For example: Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 117 (1851); Devol v. McIntosh,
23 Ind. 529 (1864); Alexander v. McPeck, 189 Mass. 34, 75 N.E. 88 (1905); Ham
v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 (1860); Fairfield v. Day, 71 N.H. 63, 51 At. 263 (1901).
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also been invoked in a variety of other situations in which one
party assumes liability for payment of the debt of another to a
third party.
23
If it be assumed that such "absolute covenants" to discharge
the debts of another are contracts to indemnify against liability,
the contract is breached by the failure of the promisor to pay at
the date agreed, and at that time a cause of action for damages ac
crues to the promisee. But to recover substantial damages, the
plaintiff must, as a general proposition, show that he has sustained
actual loss. 24 In the usual case of the debt assumption promise,
no such injury occurs to the promisee before he is required by his
creditors to make payment. Though defendants persistently and
logically have argued that only nominal damages can be recovered
under those circumstances, 25 the courts, just as persistently and
with bland unconcern for logic, have measured the damages in
the amount of the liability which defendant promised to dis-
charge.26 It has been said, in explanation of this rule, that pay-
ment of the debt by the plaintiff was not a condition or part of
the contract between the parties.27 Of course, that fact, even if
true, goes only to the issue of whether defendant has defaulted on
his obligation; it does nothing to qualify the plaintiff for the
special favor of receiving substantial damages for a wrong which
has caused him no actual loss. Several courts, in mortgage as-
sumption cases, have advanced the reasoning that the grantee's
promise to pay the mortgage debt was a part of the consideration
the grantor was to receive for the conveyance of the mortgaged
For example: Assignee of lease covenants with assignor to pay rent to lessor:
Beier v. Snitzer, 167 N.Y. Supp. 303 (1917). Stockholder covenants to pay debts
of other stockholders incurred in borrowing money to pay corporations debts:
Helms v. Appleton, 43 Ind. App. 482, 85 N.E. 783 (1908). Direct promise to
pay debts of grantee to third party in consideration for transfer of personal prop-
erty" Hems v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350, 219 N.W 287 (1928).
McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES (1935) § 20; 2 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912)
§ 790.
'Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 116, 121 (1851); Stout v. Folger, 34 Iowa
71, 75 (1871); Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 504, 20 Am. Rep. 341, 344
(1876); Hems v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350, 219 N.W 287, 288 (1928); Loosemore
v. Radford, 9 M.&W 657, 152 Eng. Rep. 277, 278 (1842).
Dye v. Mann, 10 Mich. 291 (1862), is one of the rare decisions adopting the
view that though the promisee has a cause of action for breach of the debt-as-
sumption covenant as soon as the debt matures, the damages would be only
nominal until such time as the promisee actually had to make payment to the
creditor.
' Cases cited, notes 21, 22, 28, supra.
- Morlan v. Loch, 95 Kan. 716, 149 Pac. 430 (1915).
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land, and that the grantee s failure to discharge the debt deprives
the grantor of that sum due him under the terms of the sale.
28
But the all too obvious answer here is that the consideration
represented by the debt assumption is not lost until the grantor
is himself required to pay the debt.2 Following a somewhat dif-
ferent approach, one court asserts that plaintiff's being "kept sub-
ject to a debt from which the defendant agreed to relieve him is
a continuing injury for which a sum of money which will enable
him to discharge it is an appropriate remedy in damages." 0 The
validity of this conclusion, however must turn entirely on the
content of the word "appropriate" a recovery which conflicts
"with the important and fundamental rule that actual com-
pensation will not be given for merely probable loss'1" is of
questionable propriety.
Practical consequences, as well as legal theory demonstrate the
unsatisfactory effect of the full recovery rule. As the defendant-
promisors have pointed out with alarm, such a recovery puts the
promisor under a real threat of double liability and leaves the
promisee with a court-sanctioned opportunity to enjoy an unjust
enrichment. For, once the promisee has collected his damages in
the amount of his debt to the third party, there is no clear way
to prevent him from squandering the money for any purpose he
may desire, while the hapless promisor may at the next moment
be called upon by the creditor to pay the debt to him as third-
party beneficiary of the covenant. 32 The courts which take any
notice of this situation are inclined to still the defendant's an-
guished protestations with the curt admonition that his dilemma
is of his own making, since but for his default on the promise to
""The majority practice but consummates the contract. By it the defendant
promised plaintiff to satisfy certain of its obligations as part of the purchase price
of its land. Defendant's failure to meet those obligations is a failure to complete
the purchase price due the plaintiff." Jefferson Cooperage Co. v. Getzendanner,
116 WVa. 489, 491, 182 S.E. 90, 91 (1935). Also Carpenter v. Park, 19 Cal. App.
2d 567, 66 P 2d 224 (1939); Morlan v. Loch, 95 Kan. 716, 149 Pac. 431
(1915); Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 20 Am. Rep. 341 (1876); Gustafson v.
Koehler, 177 Minn. 115, 224 N.W 699 (1929).
''See Dye v. Mann, 10 Mich. 291, 295 (1862)- "The damages, it is true, in
an action for not paying would be nominal; but still the action would lie."
;"Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 507, 20 Am. Rep. 341, 344 (1876).
2 SEDW-cicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 790.
"See Glenn, Purchasing Subject to Mortgage, (1941) 27 VA. L. REV. 853,
867 "The only practical objection is that, on its face, the rule does not insure
proper application of whatever may be collected by virtue of the judgment." Three
answers are suggested, but none is entirely convincing.
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discharge the debt, plaintiff would never have had an action
against him. 33 In a few instances the opinions have offered some
doubtful comfort to the defendant by suggesting the possibility of
some sort of equitable relief which is, however, only vaguely de-
fined.34 In one of the early cases on the subject it was observed
that the "defendant may perhaps have an equity that the money
he may pay to the plaintiff shall be applied in discharge of his
debt."35 And in another- " if there are any circumstances that
would make it just to do so, the court, on the trial, would, in
rendering judgment, see that the defendant was made safe in pay-
ing the judgment; or it might be a ground for an injunction and
relief in equity."36 The fact remains that the law court which
awards the full damages judgment is not, because of procedural
limitations, in position to protect the defendant against the danger
of double liability, and enforcement of the judgment is not con-
tingent on his receiving such protection.37
' Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 117, 126 (1851); Stout v. Folger, 34 Iowa 71,
76 (1871); Furnas v. Durgm, 119 Mass. 500, 505, 20 Am. Rep. 341, 343 (1876);
Gustafson v. Koehler, 177 Minn. 115, 224 N.W 699, 700 (1929).
This is one of the "answers" given by Glenn, Purchasing Subject to Mortgage,
(1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 853, 867.
'Cooper v. Parker, 176 Ala. 122, 57 So. 472, 474 (1912), holding that a
surety could, before paying the principal debt, foreclose a mortgage given to him
by the principal debtor as security. "In such a case, however, it seems clear that
the mortgagor-principal would have an equity to have the fund so realized applied
to the principal debt, if he still remained liable thereon." Hems v. Byers, 174
Minn. 350, 219 N.W 287, 288 (1928)- "It may be that the defendants could
require the money paid to the plaintiff to be applied on the bank debt; or, if
judgment is obtained against them, could obtain relief giving them equivalent
protection; or before judgment could adopt such procedure as would prevent
double payment. The danger of being sublected to double payment is not great."
See SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP (1950) 201-202. But see Wilson v. Stilwell, 9 Ohio
St. 467, 471 (1859), discussed in note 87, rnfra.
'Loosemore v. Radford, 9 M.&W 657, 152 Eng. Rep. 277, 278 (1842).
'Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275, 281 (1860).
, Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 508, 20 Am. Rep. 341, 345 (1876)"
"There is no mode, at law, by which this difficulty can be avoided, and the plain-
tiff enabled to receive the benefit of his contract." See Lathrop v. Atwood, 21
Conn. 117, 129 (1851. " a judgment in the present suit, and even payment
to the plaintiff can have no effect upon the claims of the unpaid creditor against
him [defendant], or in the least, exonerate him from his liability to them."
But see Wilson v. Stilwell, 9 Oio St. 467, at 470, 471 (1859) which points
out that the possibility of double liability, while a real threat in jurisdictions in
which law and equity are separate, is not a serious consideration where the two
types of remedies are available in the same court. " the court below exercising
jurisdiction in equity as well as at law, and competent to admimster equitable as
well as legal remedies, very properly saved the rights of the obligors of the bond
and defendants in the judgment, by ordering the creditors of the firm to be made
parties, and permitting the obligors to pay off the creditors of the plaintiff, and
to have the amount thus paid credited upon the judgment. And this, we tink,
ought always to be done where any party m interest, whether creditor or obligor,
demands it."
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Regardless of their theoretical and practical faults, the fore-
going principles are so firmly entrenched that their authority is
not open to successful question in indemnity contract contro-
versies. Since they are commonly applied in mortgage, partner
ship, and other express debt-assumption cases wherein the as-
suming of liability for and promising to pay the debt of another
does, for some purposes, create a quasi-suretyship relation between
the promisor in the position bf principal debtor and the promisee
in the position of surety,3s the contention naturally arises that
these same principles should control in true suretyship cases. If
this be so, the surety should be able to obtain and enforce a judg-
ment against the principal debtor for damages in the amount of
the surety s liability to the creditor, without actually having paid
the debt or any of it.
Without question, the suretyship transaction includes an obli-
gation in the principal debtor to indemnify his surety against loss
by reimbursing him for any payments on the debt made by the
surety to the creditor. If the obligation was not expressly assumed,
the law will create it from the implications of the suretyship re-
lation.39 In some respects this agreement to indemnify takes on
the character of an affirmative promise to pay the debt, so that
indemnity against liability as well as against loss is the duty of
the principal debtor to his surety. The equitable remedy of
exoneration is based on this point of view- the decree may be
regarded as in the nature of specific enforcement of the principal
debtor s promise to the surety to pay the creditor at maturity, thus
protecting the surety from the hazard of having to pay.40 How-
aCarpenter v. Park, 19 Cal. App. 2d 567, 66 P. 2d 224 (1939) (new
members of partnership who promise to pay firm debts regarded as principal
debtors to retiring partner as surety); Cave v. Belisle, 117 Colo. 180, 184 P. 2d
869 (1947) (purchaser of land who assumes and agrees to pay mortgage debt
regarded as principal debtor to ownier-grantor as surety); Salmon Falls Bk. v.
Leyser, 116 Mo. 51, 22 S.W 504 (1893 (purchaser of land who assumed notes
which his grantor had given for purchase price of land to previous grantor re-
garded as principal debtor to his grantor as surety).
'Fouts v. Maryland Casualty Co., 30 F 2d 357 (C.C.A. 4th, 1929);
Springfield National Bk. v. American Surety Co., 7 F 2d 44 (C.C.A. 6th,
192-5); Vermeule v. York Cliffs Imp. Co., 105 Me. 850, 74 Ati. 800 (1909);
ArNOLD, SurmETYSiP AN CuARANTY (1927) 240, 241, STE Ns, StmETYsinP
(1934) § 279.
Since the implied promise to pay is said to grow out of the surety s having
incurred liability at the principal debtor s behest, an exception is often made when
the surety has undertaken his obligation without the request, consent or ac-
quiescence of the debtor - the "non-consensual surety" See SnipsON, SURETYSMP
(1950) 226.
"' See Roberts v. Keene, 74 Misc. 288, 240, 133 N.Y. Supp. 1091, 1093 (1911).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ever the promise to pay is implied in law in every case of "con-
sensual suretyship," and the right of exoneration is not dependent
on the existence of an express agreement.
In true suretyship cases, the prohibition against the surety s
recovering damages from the principal debtor without first pay-
ing at least some of the debt has been so often and so positively
asserted and invoked that there can be no doubt of its force.
4
1
The principal debtor cannot "be matle liable at law for subjecting
his surety to the peril of paying his debt ",42 for "suit by the
surety must be based upon money paid by him for the principal
., and his right of action dates from the time of his payment."
4a3
Since it is commonly said that no cause of action exists until the
surety has paid something in the principal debtor s behalf, the
indemnity obligation incident to the normal suretyship trans-
action is apparently of the type which protects against actual loss,
and not against the incurring of liability In view of the theory
of the exoneration remedy, however, the position might logically
be taken that upon the failure of the debtor to pay the principal
debt at maturity he has breached his contract to the surety to pay
the debt and that a cause of action arises at that point; but only
41Howard Johnson, Inc. v. Tucker, 157 F 2d 959 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946);
United States Fidelity Co. v. State ex. rel. Finley, 69 Ind. App. 638, 122 N.E. 598,
599 (1919) ("It is the rule that a surety may not originate affirmative action until
he has paid the debt for which he is bound."); Vermeule v. York Cliffs Imp. Co.,
105 Me. 350, 74 Ati. 800, 801 (1909) ("It is well settled in this state that in an
action by a surety against his principal it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that
he has paid the debt, or discharged the principal for the amount which he seeks
to recover. "); McCormick v. Obanion, 169 Mo. App. 606, 153 S.W 267, 271
(1913) ("It goes without saying that the surety cannot recover of the pnncipal
until he first pays the surety debt."); Hellams v. Abercrombie, 15 S.C. 110, 116,
40 Am. Reo. 684, 688 (1880) ("No action can be had until a cause of action
has accruecf, and the only cause that can ordinarily exist between a principal and
Ins surety is payment of the debt by the surety."); Henegar v. Brannon, 24
Tenn. App. 1, 137 S.W 2d 889, 892 (1939) ("To entitle urn to such a decree
or judgment [for reimbursement] he must allege and prove the amount he paid.");
Meier v. Service Corp., 129 S.W 2d 690, 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (" no
cause of action in favor of plaintiff [surety] would arise, unless and until
plaintiff was compelled to pay the debts thus assumed."); Newell v. Morrow,
9 Wyo. 1, 59 Pac. 429, 431 (1899) ("A surety has no right of action against us
principal, in respect to the debt for which he is surety, until he has paid such debt
for his principal.") See Bennett v. Bennett, 230 Minn. 415, 42 N.W 2d 39, 44
(1950).
1
2 McConnell v. Scott, 15 Ohio 401, 402, 45 Am. Dec. 583 (1846).
Farmers & Mechamcs Sav. Bk. v. Jennings, 138 S.W 2d 703, 705 (Mo.
App. 1940) ("It is no longer open to question but that the surety cannot collect
any more than the amount actually paid by him with interest, and until the surety
pays the debt for which he is security, his demand has no existence.") 138 S.,
2d 703, 704.
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nominal damages would be recoverable, because the surety has not
sustained substantial damages until he pays the creditor.
If the suretyship transaction itself creates only an obligation to
indemnify against loss, the question remains as to whether any
greater liability rests on the principal debtor who, in the course
of dealing with his surety, makes an express promise that he will
pay the principal debt to the creditor. Certainly such an ex-
pression of liability is not necessary to create the obligations of re-
imbursement and exoneration.44 If the surety gives any specific
thought to the reason for exacting an express promise from the
principal debtor, it seems likely that his desire is merely to make
the nature of the transaction completely clear, and to establish
irrevocably in the mind of the debtor that he has the ultimate
responsibility for making payment. However, since the express
promise is not necessary to create that responsibility, it may well
be argued that the surety s purpose was to secure an additional
remedy for use in the event of a default on the principal obliga-
tion - perhaps an action for damages for the failure to pay the
creditor at maturity.
Apparently sureties seldom secure from their principal debtors
express promises to pay the debts, or, at least, if such promises are
obtained, not much significance is attached to them, for very few
true suretyship cases have been found in which the decision turns
on that factor. A common practice has been established in mod-
ern times, especially among the commercial surety companies, of
requiring the principal debtor to execute a formal covenant to
indemnify the surety against any loss which might arise from the
suretyship undertaking. Such contracts have been held to be
"legal and enforceable," 45 and by specifically providing for such
items as counsel fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in
resisting the creditor's claim or in otherwise serving the debtor s
interests, a surety may be able to increase the extent of reimburse-
" See note 39, supra.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bk., 17 F 2d 913,
915 (C.C.A. 8th, 1927). Also Tennant v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
17 F 2d 38 (C.C.A. 3d, 1927). National Surety Corp. v. Buckles, 219 S.W
2d 207 (Tenn. App. 1949) held that the indemnity agreement, contained in
the application for the surety bond which the principal debtor filled out and
signed; was enforceable even though he had failed to read the application and did
not realize that it included an indemnity provision. Tlus agreement authorized
the surety to settle claims against the princial debtor unless the surety was
specifically notified not to do so.
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ment he may recover after payment to the creditor. But the ex-
press provision for indemnification is not regarded as affording
the surety any new type of remedy not available under the implied
contract of indemnity which is inherent in the suretyship re-
lation.
46
Occasionally, a court, in stating the general limitation against
recovery before payment, will qualify the absoluteness of the rule.
Thus, it is said that "A surety or guarantor can not recover in-
demnity from the principal until he has paid the debt; unless
there is a clause in the contract of indemnity which varies this
general rule. '47 And in a few opinions it is positively stated,
though mostly by way of dictum, that if a surety takes an express
covenant to pay the debt from his principal debtor, he has a right
to recover damages for the failure to pay as soon as the maturity
date has passed.
48
More than a century ago, an English court, in a decision often
cited but rarely followed on its facts, allowed one who was surety
on a promissory note to recover from his prinicpal debtor the
amount of the note, even though the surety had made no payment
on the note. It was concluded, without citation of any authority.
that since the principal debtor had made an "absolute and positive
covenant" to pay the debt, the covenantee-surety "is entitled to be
placed in the same situation under this agreement, as if he had
paid the money to the payees of the bill. '49 Early in the present
century, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the right of a surety,
who had not paid the principal debt, to enforce a mortgage given
to him by the principal debtor as security. The rule was asserted
that "It is competent for the parties to so frame their contract,
either by the terms of the principal contract, or by a separate in-
dependent contract, as to authorize the surety to proceed against
his principal, or against the independent security given by the
principal to the surety, at any stated time, independently of the
6 Fouts v. Maryland Casualty Co., 30 F 2d 857 (C.C.A. 4th, 1929);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bk., 17 F 2d 918 (C.C.A.
8th, 1927); Springfield National Bk. v. American Surety Co., 7 F 2d 44
(C.C.A. 6th, 1925). See Glen Falls Indemnity Co. v. American Awmng & Tent
Co., 55 R.I. 284, 180 AUt. 367, 875 (1935).
17 Cooper v. Parker, 176 Ala. 122, 57 So. 472, 478 (1912), quoting Lane v.
Westmoreland, 79 Ala. 874 (1885).
48Tennant v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 17 F 2d 38 (C.C.A.
3d, 1927); Locke v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 95, 41 Am. Rep. 199, 201 (1881);
Hellams v. Abercrombie, 15 S.C. 110, 116, 40 Am. Rep. 684, 689 (1880).
4 Loosemore v. Radford, 9 M. & W 657, 152 Eng. Rep. 277, 278 ('1842).
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surety s prior payment of the principal debt." 0 Aside from a few
such isolated decisions, there seems to be no direct primary
authority to sustain a right in the true surety to collect substantial
damages from his principal debtor before payment, in spite of the
wide acceptance of the same principle in the mortgage and
partnership indemnity contract and similar cases.
krguing against its incorporation into suretyship law are the
same considerations which have already been discussed in regard
to the indemnity contract situation. Recovery of the amount of
the principal debt is inconsistent with basic damages law because
the surety has not yet sustained loss by paying the creditor, leaves
the principal debtor under imminent threat of double liability
by having to pay the creditor also, and puts the surety in position
to gain an undeserved advantage from his suretyship undertaking.
Furthermore, at least two distinguishing factors appear which
justify a variance between the rules governing the two transactions.
In the debt assumption cases, the original debtor, who moves into
the status of a quasi-surety by having liability for his debt assumed
by another party, gives a direct consideration in some form or
other to induce the promisor to undertake that obligation. The
most familiar example is the landowner who conveys property
subject to a mortgage lien, the grantee assuming and agreeing to
pay the debt. Obviously the grantor sells his land for a lower
price in consideration of the grantee s assumption of the debt.
While this does not, as previously indicated, make the grantor s
damages amount to the sum of the debt automatically upon the
grantee s failure to pay, yet it does give basis for the feeling as
expressed by the late Professor Glenn that it seems "more fair to
the mortgagor to adopt the rule that an indemnity contract
is broken at and with the maturity of the debt which it secures;
the measure of damages being the face amount of such debt, with
interest."i By contrast, the true surety has, of course, not given
the principal debtor any monetary remuneration for his promise
to pay the principal debt, inasmuch as that obligation was the
"'Cooper v. Parker, 176 Ala. 122, 57 So. 472, 473 (1912). Also allowing the
surety to enforce collateral security given by the principal debtor, though no pay-
ment has been made on the debt: Easton v. Boston Investment Co., 51 Cal. App.
246, 196 Pac. 796 (1921); Hellams v. Abercrombie, 15 S.C. 110, 40 Am. Rep.
684 (1880).
"'Glenn, Purchasing Sublect To Mortgage (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 853, 867.
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primary liability to which the suretyship contract appends." The
chances of injury to the surety from the principal debtor s failure
to pay lie only in the possibility that the creditor may in the future
call on him to pay The mortgagor-grantor, however, is not only
under the same peril of prospective loss but has also sacrificed a
gain in favor of the grantee in the past transaction .
3
Perhaps an even more persuasive argument for refusing the
surety the substantial damages remedy accorded to the indemnitee
rests on the availability to the former of another more effective
remedy for coercing the ultimate obligor to satisfy the debt. A suit
for exoneration brought in equity by the surety against the prin-
cipal debtor with the creditor joined as an interested party,
5 4 will
presumably force the debtor to pay his obligation directly to the
creditor thus protecting the surety against the danger of being
called upon to pay With this type of relief at hand, the surety has
no need for a damages recovery before payment of the debt. Ordi-
narily there would seem to be no basis in the debt assumption
cases for equity to take jurisdiction and give specific enforcement
relief, inasmuch as the contract in question merely calls for the
payment of money
Because there is no apparent need for the damages-before-
payment remedy for the surety and because such a recovery could
easily result in the misapplication of the money, with consequent
hardship on both principal debtors and creditors, and because the
general damages rule limiting recovery to the amount of actual
loss is a sound principle, the right to recover the damages in the
amount of the principal debt before its payment should not be
accorded to a surety The existence of an express promise from
the principal debtor to the surety to pay the debt does not
diminish the force of any of those considerations and so should
not give rise to greater rights than inhere in the suretyship status
generally As has been noted already, the courts have shown little
Morlan v. Loch, 95 Kan. 716, 149 Pac. 431 (1915) "In the ordinary case
of principal and surety, the surety parts with nothing until he pays the debt for
which he bound himself. Here the plaintiff parted with the land which the de-
fendant received."
' See Note (1925) 38 HAnv. L. tRm,. 502, 504.
'Alabama Bank & Trust Co. v. Garer, 225 Ala. 269, 142 So. 568, 570
(1982) "While the creditor may not be a necessary party to the suit, he is at
least a proper party that may 'be on hand to receive the money " See AnANT,
StuRETYSmP (1931) 320.
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inclination so to favor sureties. It is to be hoped that the some-
what overreaching assertions of some highly respected textwriters,
in this one instance not well supported by their cited authority,
will not divert the law into wayward paths.
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